Iran's Military Capabilities (Translation of Interview with Le Monde)
Given that the war with Iran has started, I am posting the English language version of my interview with Le Monde on Iranian military capabilities from a few days ago.
As negotiations between the United States and Iran appear deeply stalled, the ballistic arsenal available to Tehran is causing considerable concern in the West. Has it been rebuilt since the last Israeli-American strike campaign in June 2025?
The part of the Iranian arsenal most affected was its medium-range ballistic missiles [covering roughly 1,000 to 2,000 kilometres, which put Israeli territory within range of Tehran]. However, according to most available information, Iran has since been able to produce ballistic missiles at an impressive rate by international standards, and in facilities that were not damaged during the war.
We do not know the exact number, but this has generated concern. The main problem for Tehran remains the availability of its launchers, which are required to fire the missiles. Many were destroyed or damaged in June 2025. And so far, the method Iran has used to repair them has not been very effective.
Are the Iranians once again in a position to launch missiles from the west of the country, the region that gives them the easiest ability to target Israel?
Yes, because Iran has deeply buried and fortified missile silos, and has made efforts to repair those sites [following the strikes]. What is not known, however, is whether the missiles housed in those facilities were damaged and whether they have been able to be retrieved. The same applies to the launchers: Iran had not dispersed them at the outset of the war. It is therefore possible that they are damaged.
What is the current state of Iran’s air defence and anti-missile capabilities, which were also badly hit by the Israeli-American strikes?
A large portion of the S-300 systems [of Russian manufacture], which represent the country’s most advanced air defence capabilities, had their radars damaged or destroyed in the strikes of October 2024 and then those of June 2025. Satellite imagery shows Iran attempting to use domestically produced radars, pairing them with launchers equivalent to the S-300, known as the “Bavar-373” [in service since 2019].
Recently, Tehran also ordered from the Russians small portable air defence systems called “Verba.” These are primarily intended for use against cruise missiles and drones. This reflects a shift in Iranian air defence strategy, with an orientation toward cheaper and faster methods of defending the territory.
That said, the country’s defensive capabilities are not very robust at the moment. The regime knows it will not be able to meaningfully defend itself against American or Israeli fighter aircraft.
Are Russia and China genuinely supporting Iran militarily today, unlike what happened in June 2025?
Before the “twelve-day war,” a large portion of Iranian military technology already came from Russia or China. Russia was not in a position to supply Iran with air defence systems, but it did train Iranians in air defence following the strikes of October 2024.
The Chinese, for their part, have been less visible until now. But it is certain that after the “twelve-day war,” Iran moved quickly to sign contracts with the Russians and the Chinese, including for the acquisition of anti-ship missiles. Russia and China are therefore prepared to defy American warnings regarding the delivery of military systems to Iran. This shows that they have a direct stake in the survival of the regime. Fundamentally, this changes the game for Iran.
Russia and China also appear willing to assist Iran in the space domain, and Mr Trump has accused Iran of now being capable of striking the American continent — what is the reality?
Space technology and space launch vehicles are essential to any long-range intercontinental ballistic missile programme [capable, for example, of targeting the United States], and there has potentially been, recently, Russian support for the Iranian space programme. Since the start of the war in Ukraine [in which Iran provides substantial military support to Russia], Iran has begun to achieve very good results in tests of these launchers, which was not previously the case. I do not think Iran would target the United States, but that is what Mr Trump is alluding to.
What tactical lessons has Iran drawn from the Israeli-American strikes of June 2025?
The country has raised its alert level and its readiness for strikes: greater dispersal of forces and more camouflage in order to ensure command continuity in the event of an attack. The authorities also appear to have accepted that they will not be able to intercept all incoming strikes. The objective is now to better protect strategic sites, notably through deeper underground burial of sensitive infrastructure.
Finally, Tehran has drawn a lesson in deterrence: missile strikes against Israel had, according to the regime, a genuine psychological impact. Even at a conventional disadvantage, the ability to target urban centres constitutes a lever for raising the political cost of escalation, for both Israel and the United States.
What is your assessment of the current state of the Iranian nuclear programme?
Overall, the Iranian nuclear programme has been severely damaged and is no longer functioning in its previous configuration. There is nothing at this stage to indicate that Tehran has decided to restart a clandestine military programme, particularly since such an effort would be difficult to conceal from Western surveillance. Iran has partially rebuilt the Parchin site by burying it more deeply, but without any known sensitive material present. Elsewhere, the focus is primarily on reinforcing and protecting existing facilities.
The main uncertainty concerns the stockpiles of highly enriched uranium stored underground, the exact location of which remains unclear. For now, the nuclear question is more political than military: stockpiles and technical capabilities still exist, but there is no longer a fully operational programme. In the short term, the reconstitution of ballistic capabilities appears more worrying than a rapid restart of the nuclear programme.
Do Tehran’s regional supporters retain any real retaliatory capability in the event of American strikes?
The Houthis remain today the most immediate source of operational support. They have already demonstrated their capabilities by forcing the United States to deploy its interception systems in the Red Sea on a massive scale, contributing to the depletion of its munition stockpiles. The Iraqi militias have a more limited capability, essentially confined to the threat against American bases in Iraq.
Hezbollah represents the major strategic unknown. The movement would be seeking to reconstitute itself. Its absence of meaningful engagement during the “twelve-day war” was probably perceived in Tehran as a failure. The question remains whether, since then, Iran has reinforced its support to restore its capabilities.